SCRAMBLE: The State, Connectivity and Routing Augmentation Model for Building Logic Encryption
SCRAMBLE: The State, Connectivity and Routing Augmentation Model for Building Logic Encryption
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DOI：
10.1109/isvlsi49217.2020.00037
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发表时间：
2020-05
期刊：
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通讯作者：
Hadi Mardani Kamali;K. Z. Azar;H. Homayoun;Avesta Sasan
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文献类型：
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作者：
Hadi Mardani Kamali;K. Z. Azar;H. Homayoun;Avesta Sasan
在本文中，我们介绍了SCRAMBLE，作为一种新的逻辑锁定解决方案的时序电路，而对扫描链的访问是有限的。SCRAMBLE可用于通过在大量密钥控制的假转换中隐藏状态转换图（STG）来锁定FSM。此外，它还可以用来锁定时序电路（时序数据路径），通过隐藏大量的密钥控制的假连接之间的时序路径的连接。此外，SCRAMBLE的结构允许我们从事作为一个新的扫描链锁定解决方案，通过隐藏在大量的密钥控制的假序列的正确的扫描链序列。我们证明了该方案抵抗（1）FSM上的2阶段攻击，和（2）SAT攻击结合展开以及有界模型检查。我们已经讨论了SCRAMBLE的两种变体：（I）连接SCRAMBLE（SCRAMBLE-C）和（B）逻辑SCRAMBLE（SCRAMBLE-L）。SCRAMBLE-C依赖于SAT硬和键控模块，这些模块是使用近无阻塞对数开关网络构建的。SCRAMBLE-L使用输入多路复用技术将FSM的一部分隐藏在存储器中。在结果部分，我们描述了每个变体对最先进攻击的有效性。
In this paper, we introduce SCRAMBLE, as a novel logic locking solution for sequential circuits while the access to the scan chain is restricted. The SCRAMBLE could be used to lock an FSM by hiding its state transition graph (STG) among a large number of key-controlled false transitions. Also, it could be used to lock sequential circuits (sequential datapath) by hiding the timing paths' connectivity among a large number of key-controlled false connections. Besides, the structure of SCRAMBLE allows us to engage this scheme as a new scan chain locking solution by hiding the correct scan chain sequence among a large number of the key-controlled false sequences. We demonstrate that the proposed scheme resists against both (1) the 2-stage attacks on FSM, and (2) SAT attacks integrated with unrolling as well as bounded-modelchecking. We have discussed two variants of SCRAMBLE: (I) Connectivity SCRAMBLE (SCRAMBLE-C), and (b) Logic SCRAMBLE (SCRAMBLE-L). The SCRAMBLE-C relies on the SAT-hard and key-controlled modules that are built using near non-blocking logarithmic switching networks. The SCRAMBLE-L uses input multiplexing techniques to hide a part of the FSM in a memory. In the result section, we describe the effectiveness of each variant against state-of-the-art attacks.