What Do You Mean I Should Take Responsibility for My Own Ill Health
What Do You Mean I Should Take Responsibility for My Own Ill Health
复制标题
我应该为自己的健康欠佳负责是什么意思
DOI：
--
复制
发表时间：
2009
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Nicole A. Vincent
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Nicole A. Vincent
运气平等主义者认为，对责任的考虑可以为背离严格平等找到借口。然而，批评者认为，让责任发挥这一作用会产生令人反感的严重后果。运气平等主义者通常要么解释为什么这种严厉并不过分，要么从默认的责任追踪规则中找出所谓的合法排除，以缓和这种严厉。作为回应，批评者分别否认这种严厉并不过分，或者他们认为这些排除是无效的或缺乏正当理由。在批评了这两种立场之后，我认为，这种进行辩论的方式--即关于责任的苛刻要求是否超过其他考虑的辩论，以及关于排除责任追踪是否有效和/或合理的辩论--是非常有问题的。在我看来，责任的要求并不--事实上，它们不可能--与其他规范性考虑的要求相冲突，因为责任只是提供了一种形式结构，在这种结构中，那些其他考虑决定了人们可能被如何对待，但它并不产生自己的实践要求。
Luck egalitarians think that considerations of responsibility can excuse departures from strict equality. However critics argue that allowing responsibility to play this role has objectionably harsh consequences. Luck egalitarians usually respond either by explaining why that harshness is not excessive, or by identifying allegedly legitimate exclusions from the default responsibility-tracking rule to tone down that harshness. And in response, critics respectively deny that this harshness is not excessive, or they argue that those exclusions would be ineffective or lacking in justification. Rather than taking sides, after criticizing both positions I also argue that this way of carrying on the debate – i.e. as a debate about whether the harsh demands of responsibility outweigh other considerations, and about whether exclusions to responsibility-tracking would be effective and/or justified – is deeply problematic. On my account, the demands of responsibility do not – in fact, they can not – conflict with the demands of other normative considerations, because responsibility only provides a formal structure within which those other considerations determine how people may be treated, but it does not generate its own practical demands.