Multi-Level State Capitalism: Chinese State-Owned Buisness Groups
Multi-Level State Capitalism: Chinese State-Owned Buisness Groups
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DOI：
10.1017/mor.2018.36
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发表时间：
2018-11
影响因子：
2.9
通讯作者：
Jakob Arnoldi;A. Villadsen;Xin Chen;Chaohong Na
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Jakob Arnoldi;A. Villadsen;Xin Chen;Chaohong Na
本文认为，中国国有企业集团的纵向连锁是顶尖企业和关联企业之间协调和信息交换的重要机制，也是企业集团的政府所有者实施控制的机制。通过将资源依赖理论与交易成本经济学和代理理论中的要素相结合，我们认为政府所有权水平越高，连锁的必要性就越大。因此，中央政府比省级政府更有可能使用垂直联锁，省级政府也比市政府更有可能使用垂直联锁。基于这些论证，我们提出了三个假设。对手工收集的数据集进行的回归分析发现，我们的假设得到了强有力的支持。我们的结果揭示了中国国有部门内部的协调和治理问题，以及政府所有者和国有集团附属公司使用的缓解这些问题的重要手段。
ABSTRACT We argue that vertical interlocks in Chinese state-owned business groups are important mechanisms for coordination and information exchange between the apex firm and affiliated firms, and that they are also mechanisms for government owners of the business groups to exercise control. By combining resource dependence theory with elements from transaction cost economics and agency theory, we propose that the need for interlocks increases the higher the level of government ownership. The central government is therefore more likely to use vertical interlocks than the provincial governments, which again are more likely to use vertical interlocks than the municipal governments. We develop three hypotheses based on these arguments. A regression analysis of a hand-collected data set finds strong support for our hypotheses. Our results shed light on coordination and governance issues within the state-owned sector in China and on an important means for mitigating these issues used by the government owners and firms affiliated with state-owned groups.