Competitive foreclosure∗
Competitive foreclosure∗
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竞争性止赎
DOI：
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发表时间：
2017
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
J. Sákovics
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Roberto Burguet;J. Sákovics
我们提出了一个模型，寡头企业生产的替代品竞争的投入在一个分散的市场。投入供应商的能力有限（或在独家经营下生产）。与接受价格的投入市场相比，排除下游竞争者的动机不仅导致投入价格上涨，而且还导致获得更高的投入总量。这一新的特征减轻了下游市场势力的输出减少效应，甚至可以恢复唯一（输入）市场清算均衡中的效率。在其他均衡中，企业内生性地协调供应商的目标，导致过度的投入供应（非自愿失业，如果投入是劳动力），甚至更高的投入价格。我们的见解推广到替代垂直结构。JEL代码：D43、L11、L13。
We present a model where oligopolistic firms producing substitutes compete for inputs in a decentralized market. Input suppliers are capacity constrained (or produce under exclusivity). Compared to a price-taking input market, the incentive to foreclose downstream competitors not only leads to higher input prices, but it also results in a higher aggregate amount of input acquired. This novel feature mitigates the output reducing effect of downstream market power and may even restore effi ciency in the unique (input) market clearing equilibrium. Other equilibria where firms endogenously coordinate on which suppliers to target result in excess input supply (involuntary unemployment, if input is labor) and even higher input prices. Our insights generalize to alternative vertical structures. JEL Codes: D43, L11, L13.