Target-oriented utility theory for modeling the deterrent effects of counterterrorism
Target-oriented utility theory for modeling the deterrent effects of counterterrorism
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DOI：
10.1016/j.ress.2014.11.006
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发表时间：
2015-04
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
V. Bier;Fuat Kosanoglu
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
V. Bier;Fuat Kosanoglu
安全方面的最佳资源分配一直是关键基础设施保护的一个重大挑战。许多研究使用博弈论作为选择的方法，因为攻击者通常可以观察防御者在安全方面的投资，并相应地调整他的策略选择。然而，这些模式大多没有明确考虑威慑，结果是，如果减少投资就足以威慑攻击，则可能导致资源浪费。在本文中，我们假设防御者是不确定的防御投资水平，将阻止攻击，并使用目标导向的效用，以优化防御投资水平，考虑到威慑的概率。
Optimal resource allocation in security has been a significant challenge for critical infrastructure protection. Numerous studies use game theory as the method of choice, because of the fact that an attacker can often observe the defender’s investment in security and adapt his choice of strategies accordingly. However, most of these models do not explicitly consider deterrence, with the result that they may lead to wasted resources if less investment would be sufficient to deter an attack. In this paper, we assume that the defender is uncertain about the level of defensive investment that would deter an attack, and use the target-oriented utility to optimize the level of defensive investment, taking into account the probability of deterrence.