Loyalty for sale? Military spending and coups d’etat
Loyalty for sale? Military spending and coups d’etat
复制标题
出售忠诚度？军费开支和政变
DOI：
10.1007/s11127-013-0124-4
复制
发表时间：
2014
期刊：
影响因子：
1.6
通讯作者：
G. Leon
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
G. Leon
政变在世界各地仍然很常见，常常导致领导人和机构的变化。我们研究了军费开支和政变之间的关系，发现（i）成功的政变比失败的政变增加更多的军费开支，（ii）当军费开支占 GDP 的比重相对较低时，政变的可能性更大。我们的识别策略通过利用政变结果与随之而来的军费开支变化之间的条件独立性来处理政变与军费开支之间的反向因果关系问题。我们将我们的结果解释为军方可能发动政变以增加资金的证据，并排除了几种其他解释。
Coups d’etat continue to be common around the world, often leading to changes in leaders and institutions. We examine the relationship between military spending and coups and find that (i) successful coups increase military spending by more than failed attempts, and (ii) coups are more likely when military spending as a share of GDP is relatively low. Our identification strategy deals with the problem of reverse causality between coups and military spending by exploiting the conditional independence between a coup’s outcome and the change in military spending that follows it. We interpret our results as evidence that the military may stage coups in order to increase its funding, and rule out several alternative explanations.