Targeted Privacy Attacks by Fingerprinting Mobile Apps in LTE Radio Layer
Targeted Privacy Attacks by Fingerprinting Mobile Apps in LTE Radio Layer
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DOI：
10.1109/dsn58367.2023.00035
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发表时间：
2023-06
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Jaejong Baek;P. Soundrapandian;Sukwha Kyung;Ruoyu Wang;Yan Shoshitaishvili;Adam Doupé;Gail-Joon Ahn
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文献类型：
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作者：
Jaejong Baek;P. Soundrapandian;Sukwha Kyung;Ruoyu Wang;Yan Shoshitaishvili;Adam Doupé;Gail-Joon Ahn
我们研究了仅使用LTE移动的网络的物理信道中可用的信息进行有针对性的隐私攻击的可行性，并提出了三种隐私攻击来证明这种可行性：移动应用程序指纹攻击，历史攻击和相关攻击。这些攻击可以揭示目标移动的设备的地理位置，受害者的应用程序使用模式，甚至是同一LTE网络小区内两个用户之间的关系。攻击者还可以通过捕获空中传输的无线电信号，仅使用被动嗅探器作为设备，悄悄地发起这些攻击。为了确保这些攻击对移动的用户隐私的影响，我们在实验室和现实环境中进行了评估，证明了它们的实用性和可靠性。此外，我们认为这些攻击不仅可以针对4G/LTE，还可以针对不断发展的5G标准。
We investigate the feasibility of targeted privacy attacks using only information available in physical channels of LTE mobile networks and propose three privacy attacks to demonstrate this feasibility: mobile-app fingerprinting attack, history attack, and correlation attack. These attacks can reveal the geolocation of targeted mobile devices, the victim's app usage patterns, and even the relationship between two users within the same LTE network cell. An attacker also may launch these attacks stealthily by capturing radio signals transmitted over the air, using only a passive sniffer as equipment. To ensure the impact of these attacks on mobile users' privacy, we perform evaluations in both laboratory and real-world settings, demonstrating their practicality and dependability. Furthermore, we argue that these attacks can target not only 4G/LTE but also the evolving 5G standards.