Behavior-Based Price Discrimination by a Patient Seller
Behavior-Based Price Discrimination by a Patient Seller
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耐心卖家基于行为的价格歧视
DOI：
10.1515/1935-1704.1889
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发表时间：
2011
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
K. McCardle
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
S. Bikhchandani;K. McCardle
我们研究了一个模型，在该模型中，一个卖方和一个买方分别在两个时期内进行交易。买方每期对一件非耐用品有需求。买方对商品的保留价值是私人信息，在这两个时期是相同的。卖家承诺在两个阶段中的每一个阶段提供价格。第二阶段的价格可能取决于买家在第一阶段的行为。不同于以前文献中研究的等折扣因子情形，我们证明了当卖家比买家更有耐心时，第二阶段的价格在购买之后会增加。具体地说，最优动态定价方案不是最优静态定价方案的重复。
We investigate a model in which one seller and one buyer trade in each of two periods. The buyer has demand for one unit of a non-durable object per period. The buyer's reservation value for the good is private information and is the same in both periods. The seller commits to prices in each of two periods. Prices in the second period may depend on the buyer's first-period behavior. Unlike the equal discount factor case studied in earlier papers, we show that when the seller is more patient than the buyer, second-period prices increase after a purchase. In particular, the optimal dynamic pricing scheme is not a repetition of the optimal static pricing scheme.