Commitment versus Discretion in the Peasant-Dictator Game
Commitment versus Discretion in the Peasant-Dictator Game
复制标题
农民独裁者博弈中的承诺与自由裁量权
DOI：
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发表时间：
1995
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Mary F. Walters
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
J. Huyck;R. Battalio;Mary F. Walters
摘要我们报告了一项实验，旨在测试简单讨价还价游戏中承诺与谨慎的影响。博弈论预测和公共政策文献强调，作出承诺的能力促进效率。我们发现，在实验中的承诺显着提高效率。最后，我们将我们的研究结果与现存的文献中广泛的形式讨价还价的实验，通过检查公平和信任的解释，一些观察到的异常。经济文献分类号：C720、C790、C920、E610。
Abstract We report an experiment designed to test the influence of commitment versus discretion in a simple bargaining game. Game theory predicts and the public policy literature emphasizes that the ability to make commitments promotes efficiency. We find that commitment does significantly increase efficiency in the experiment. Finally, we relate our findings to the extant literature on extensive form bargaining experiments by examining fairness and trust as explanations for some observed anomalies. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C720, C790, C920, E610.