Costly signalling theories: beyond the handicap principle
Costly signalling theories: beyond the handicap principle
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DOI：
10.1007/s10539-011-9297-8
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发表时间：
2012-03-01
影响因子：
2.5
通讯作者：
Fraser, Ben
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Fraser, Ben
最近对代价信号理论的两个综述--Maynard-Smith和Harper(2003)和Searcy和Nowicki(2005)--都拒绝将通过不诚实惩罚保持诚实的信号算作代价信号，因为(1)诚实信号在代价高昂的信号情况下必须代价高昂，以及(2)对不诚实的惩罚本身需要解释。我认为，这两位研究人员都错了：(2)并不是将通过惩罚不诚实而保持诚实的信号视为代价高昂的信号的理由，(1)暴露了对代价高昂的信号理论的某些版本的过于狭隘的关注。在论证过程中，我提出了一个新的信号成本分类模式，这为未来关于代价高昂的信号成本的概念性和经验性工作提出了富有成效的研究问题。
Two recent overviews of costly signalling theory-Maynard-Smith and Harper (2003) and Searcy and Nowicki (2005)-both refuse to count signals kept honest by punishment of dishonesty, as costly signals, because (1) honest signals must be costly in cases of costly signalling, and (2) punishment of dishonesty itself requires explanation. I argue that both pairs of researchers are mistaken: (2) is not a reason to discount signals kept honest by punishment of dishonesty as cases of costly signalling, and (1) betrays too narrow a focus on certain versions of costly signalling theory. In the course of so arguing, I propose a new schema for classifying signal costs, which suggests productive research questions for future conceptual and empirical work on costly signalling.