Theories of price formation and exchange in double oral auctions
Theories of price formation and exchange in double oral auctions
复制标题
双重口头拍卖中的价格形成和交换理论
DOI：
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发表时间：
1986
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
J. Ledyard
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
D. Easley;J. Ledyard
我们提供了一个理论来解释实验产生的数据与双重口头拍卖。我们的理论预测收敛到均衡隐含的法律的需求和供应，并提供了一个解释不均衡的行为。我们理论的预测似乎比瓦尔拉斯、马歇尔或博弈论模型的预测更符合数据。我们的理论还表明，在需求-供应环境中，双重口头拍卖是非常强大的意义上说，总的表现是类似的一个非常广泛的个人行为。
We provide a theory to explain the data generated by experiments with double oral auctions. Our theory predicts convergence to the equilibrium implied by the law of demand and supply and provides an explanation of disequilibrium behavior. The predictions of our theory seem to fit the data better than do the predictions of Walrasian, Marshallian, or game theoretic models. Our theory also suggests that, in demand-supply environments, the double oral auction is remarkably robust in the sense that aggregate performance is similar for a very wide range of individual behaviors.