Sustainability investment under cap-and-trade regulation

Sustainability investment under cap-and-trade regulation
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限额与交易监管下的可持续投资

DOI:
10.1007/s10479-013-1514-1
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发表时间:
2016-05-01
影响因子:
4.8
通讯作者:
Ng, Chi To
Ng, Chi To
中科院分区:
管理学3区
文献类型:
--
作者:
Dong, Ciwei;Shen, Bin;Ng, Chi To

文献摘要

被引文献

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碳减排是环境可持续发展的热点问题,而总量管制与交易制度被认为是减少碳排放的有效途径。根据真实的工业实践,可持续产品意味着其生产过程有利于减少碳排放,并对市场需求有积极的响应。本文研究了分散式和集中式供应链中考虑排放管制的可持续产品投资问题。首先研究了由一个零售商和一个制造商组成的分散式供应链中零售商的订货量和制造商的可持续投资。之后,我们将研究扩展到集中案例,确定整个供应链的生产数量和可持续发展投资。我们得到了最优订货量(或生产量)和可持续投资,并发现可持续投资效率对最优解有显著影响。此外,我们进行了数值研究,并发现令人惊讶的是,由于可持续性和排放考虑的影响,订单数量可能会增加批发价格。此外,我们还研究了不同契约对供应链协调的影响,发现只有收益共享契约能够协调供应链,而回购契约和两部制价格契约则不能。重要的见解和管理的影响进行了讨论。
Carbon emission abatement is a hot topic in environmental sustainability and cap-and-trade regulation is regarded as an effective way to reduce the carbon emission. According to the real industrial practices, sustainable product implies that its production processes facilitate to reduce the carbon emission and has a positive response in market demand. In this paper, we study the sustainability investment on sustainable product with emission regulation consideration for decentralized and centralized supply chains. We first examine the order quantity of the retailer and sustainability investment of the manufacturer for the decentralized supply chain with one retailer and one manufacturer. After that, we extend our study to the centralized case where we determine the production quantity and sustainability investment for the whole supply chain. We derive the optimal order quantity (or production quantity) and sustainability investment, and find that the sustainability investment efficiency has a significant impact on the optimal solutions. Further, we conduct numerical studies and find surprisingly that the order quantity may be increasing in the wholesale price due to the effects of the sustainability and emission consideration. Moreover, we investigate the achievability of supply chain coordination by various contracts, and find that only revenue sharing contract can coordinate the supply chain whereas the buyback contract and two-part tariff contract cannot. Important insights and managerial implications are discussed.