Government's response to Hurricane Katrina: A public choice analysis
Government's response to Hurricane Katrina: A public choice analysis
复制标题
政府对卡特里娜飓风的反应：公共选择分析
DOI：
10.1007/s11127-006-7730-3
复制
发表时间：
2006
期刊：
影响因子：
1.6
通讯作者：
P. Leeson
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
R. Sobel;P. Leeson
我们用公共选择理论来解释联邦应急管理局和其他政府机构在卡特里娜飓风后未能进行有效的救灾。我们关注的领域包括：（1）官僚主义导致的反公地悲剧，（2）决策中的第二类错误政策偏见导致的过度谨慎，（3）为赢得选票而对灾害申报和救灾援助的政治操纵，（4）及时准确的偏好披露问题，（5）政府官员的荣耀追求，（6）短视效应导致政府决策偏差。
We use public choice theory to explain the failure of FEMA and other governmental agencies to carry out effective disaster relief in the wake of Hurricane Katrina. The areas in which we focus are: (1) the tragedy of the anti-commons resulting from layered bureaucracy, (2) a type-two error policy bias causing over cautiousness in decision making, (3) the political manipulation of disaster declarations and relief aid to win votes, (4) the problem of acquiring timely and accurate preference revelations, (5) glory seeking by government officials, and (6) the shortsightedness effect causing a bias in governmental decision making.