On the Economics of the “Meeting Competition Defense” Under the Robinson–Patman Act
On the Economics of the “Meeting Competition Defense” Under the Robinson–Patman Act
复制标题
论罗宾逊-帕特曼法案下“会议竞争辩护”的经济学
DOI：
10.1515/bejeap-2015-0146
复制
发表时间：
2015
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Iñaki Aguirre
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Iñaki Aguirre
摘要本文研究了市场竞争压力不同时，三度价格歧视的福利效应。特别地，我们研究了罗宾森-帕特曼法案与“会议竞争防御”相关的经济方面。使用均衡模型，我们发现的主要结果是，这种辩护可能在不应该使用的情况下成功地用于初级线损害，即当价格歧视减少社会福利时。无论是在最终产品市场上出现歧视，还是在中间产品市场上使用歧视，都能得到这一结果。我们还发现，这些结果在继发性损伤下也可以维持。
Abstract This paper studies the welfare effects of third-degree price discrimination when competitive pressure varies across markets. In particular, we study the economic aspects of the Robinson–Patman Act associated with the “meeting competition defense.” Using equilibrium models, the main result we find is that this defense might be used successfully in cases of primary line injury precisely when it should not be used, namely when price discrimination reduces social welfare. This result obtains both when discrimination appears in the final good market and when it is used in the intermediate goods market. We also find that these results may maintain under secondary line injury.