Scurvy and the Ontology of Natural Kinds
Scurvy and the Ontology of Natural Kinds
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坏血病和自然种类的本体论
DOI：
10.1017/psa.2023.19
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发表时间：
2023
影响因子：
1.7
通讯作者：
P. Magnus
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
P. Magnus
摘要 一些哲学家将自然类理解为限制探究的范畴。为了详细阐述适合这种描述的形而上学，我考虑了坏血病、柑橘和维生素 C 的复杂历史。以浅层方式（作为纯粹的属性集群）或以深层方式（作为基本属性）理解这些类别可能很诱人。这两种方法都不够充分，而这种情况需要中层本体论：从我们在世界上识别的类别开始并详细阐述它们的结构，但不要假装跳到一个关于基本存在的完整故事。
Abstract Some philosophers understand natural kinds to be the categories which are constraints on enquiry. In order to elaborate the metaphysics appropriate to such an account, I consider the complicated history of scurvy, citrus, and vitamin C. It may be tempting to understand these categories in a shallow way (as mere property clusters) or in a deep way (as fundamental properties). Neither approach is adequate, and the case instead calls for middle-range ontology: starting from categories which we identify in the world and elaborating their structure, but not pretending to jump ahead to a complete story about fundamental being.