Suppression of Social Conflict and Evolutionary Transitions to Cooperation
Suppression of Social Conflict and Evolutionary Transitions to Cooperation
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DOI：
10.1086/663679
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发表时间：
2012-02-01
影响因子：
2.9
通讯作者：
Cant, Michael A.
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Cant, Michael A.
进化冲突出现在生物组织的各个层面，并成为合作进化的障碍。这一障碍可以通过减少亚单位适应度最优之间差异的机制来克服，有时被称为冲突的“战场”。另一种未经研究的可能性是，投入冲突的努力是无利可图的。这种可能性很少受到关注，因为大多数现有的社会冲突模型都假设适合度取决于参与者冲突努力的比例，因此以零冲突努力为特征的“和平”结果在进化上是不稳定的。在这里，我表明和平结果是稳定的，成功取决于差异，而不是在冲突中投入的努力的比例。这些不同形式的模型特别适用于模拟镇压或维持治安的策略。该模型表明，信息不完全和力量不对称可以消除群体内部，甚至是不相关个体之间代价高昂的冲突，从而促进合作的进化。
Evolutionary conflict arises at all levels of biological organization and presents a barrier to the evolution of cooperation. This barrier can be overcome by mechanisms that reduce the disparity between the fitness optima of subunits, sometimes called the "battleground" of conflict. An alternative, unstudied possibility is that effort invested in conflict is unprofitable. This possibility has received little attention because most existing models of social conflict assume that fitness depends on the ratio of players' conflict efforts, so that "peaceful" outcomes featuring zero conflict effort are evolutionarily unstable. Here I show that peaceful outcomes are stable where success depends on the difference rather than the ratio of efforts invested in conflict. These difference form models are particularly appropriate to model strategies of suppression or policing. The model suggests that incomplete information and asymmetries in strength can act to eliminate costly conflict within groups, even among unrelated individuals, and thereby facilitate the evolution of cooperation.