Inductive Game Theory: Discrimination and Prejudices
Inductive Game Theory: Discrimination and Prejudices
复制标题
归纳博弈论:歧视和偏见
DOI:
10.1111/1097-3923.00005
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发表时间:
1999
影响因子:
1.1
通讯作者:
Akihiko Matsui
中科院分区:
文献类型:
--
作者:
Mamoru Kaneko;Akihiko Matsui
This paper proposes a new theory, which we call inductive game theory. In this theory, the individual player does not have a priori knowledge of the structure of the game that he plays repeatedly. Instead, he accumulates experiences induced by occasional random trials in the repeated play. A stationary state is required to be stable against intentional deviations based on the player's experiences, and then it turns out to be a Nash equilibrium. The main part of the paper is the consideration of possible individual views of the society based on individual experiences. This view is defined to be a model of the society which the player builds from his experiences. Coherency with these experiences and a condition called rationalization are required for a model. As concrete objects of the theory, this paper analyzes the phenomena of discrimination and prejudice. The development of the new theory is undertaken by contrasting its observational and behavioral aspects with mental and judgmental aspects. The relationship between discrimination and prejudice will emerge in this dichotomous consideration. Copyright 1999 by Blackwell Publishing Inc.