Optimal Leniency Programs
Optimal Leniency Programs
复制标题
最佳宽大处理计划
DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.235092
复制
发表时间：
2000
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
G. Spagnolo
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
G. Spagnolo
宽大处理计划减轻了对自我报告的违法者的制裁。我关注的是它们通过增加对合作伙伴“欺骗”的激励，来阻止价格垄断卡特尔——以及总体上有组织犯罪的能力。减轻或取消对自发报告方的制裁的适度宽大计划——就像现实中通常实施的那样——无法影响卡特尔和其他有组织犯罪。奖励自发自我报告的当事人的勇敢的宽大计划反而可能完全地、毫无代价地阻止他们。当罚款/奖励是纯粹的转移时，最优的宽大计划将自我报告的奖励最大化。当融资奖励成本高昂时，最优的宽大处理方案仅限于第一个报告方，并使其成为其他支付罚款的剩余索赔人。
Leniency programs reduce sanctions for law violators that self-report. I focus on their ability to deter price-fixing cartels - and organized crime in general - by increasing incentives to "cheat" on partners. Moderate leniency programs that reduce/cancel sanctions for a spontaneously reporting party - as those normally implemented in reality - cannot affect cartels and other organized crime. Courageous leniency programs that reward spontaneously self-reporting parties may instead completely and costlessly deter them. When fines/rewards are pure transfers, optimal leniency programs maximize rewards for self-reporting. When financing rewards is costly, optimal leniency programs are restricted to the first reporting party and make this residual claimant for the fines paid by the others.
影响因子：
6.1
作者：
ABREU, D
通讯作者：
ABREU, D