Value, Consistency, and Random Coalition Formation
Value, Consistency, and Random Coalition Formation
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价值、一致性和随机联盟形成
DOI：
10.1006/game.1996.0005
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发表时间：
1996
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
R. Evans
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
R. Evans
给定一个n人合作博弈和一个可行的“年龄”n向量，假设合作博弈中的参与者被随机分成两个联盟，每个联盟有一个随机选择的领导者;两个领导者进行双边谈判，每个领导者从他的份额中支付工资给联盟中的每个成员，工资由工资向量指定。如果工资向量等于事前预期收益向量，则称其与上述过程一致。我们证明，如果所有的2-联盟分区是同样可能的，如果双边讨价还价平分盈余，那么唯一一致的支付向量是Shapley值。一个等价的一致性结果适用于具有两个以上元素的分区。这些结果与Gul（1989）关于Shapley值的非合作实现的结果有关。经济文献分类号026。
Abstract Given an n -player cooperative game and a feasible “age” n -vector suppose that the players in a cooperative game are randomly split into two coalitions, each with a randomly chosen leader; the two leaders bargain bilaterally and each pays, out of his share, a wage to each member of his coalition as specified by the wage vector. The wage vector is said to be consistent with the above procedure if it is equal to the ex ante expected payoff vector. We prove that if all 2-coalition partitions are equally likely and if the bilateral bargain splits the surplus equally then the unique consistent payoff vector is the Shapley value. An equivalent consistency result holds for partitions with more than two elements. These results are related to Gul's (1989) result on noncooperative implementation of the Shapley value. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number 026.