CENTRAL BANK REPUTATION AND THE MONETIZATION OF DEFICITS: THE 1981 ITALIAN MONETARY REFORM
CENTRAL BANK REPUTATION AND THE MONETIZATION OF DEFICITS: THE 1981 ITALIAN MONETARY REFORM
复制标题
央行声誉与赤字货币化：1981 年意大利货币改革
DOI：
10.1111/j.1465-7295.1987.tb00734.x
复制
发表时间：
1987
期刊：
影响因子：
1.8
通讯作者：
G. Tabellini
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
G. Tabellini
1981年，意大利银行被免除了在财政部拍卖中购买未售出公债的义务。自那以后，意大利央行就减少了债务货币化。本文试图通过分析政府和财政当局之间的博弈来解释这一政策转变。财政当局对央行的偏好知之甚少。存在一种均衡，在这种均衡中，央行不会货币化，从而建立起独立的声誉。与非宽松政策相比，货币化会增加财政赤字，并可能增加公共债务。版权所有，牛津大学出版社1987年出版。
In 1981 the Bank of Italy was freed from the obligation to purchase the unsold public debt at the Treasury auctions. Si nce then, the Bank of Italy has reduced debt monetization. This paper seeks to explain this policy shift by analyzing a game between the m onetary and fiscal authorities. The fiscal authority is imperfectly i nformed about the central bank preferences. An equilibrium exists in which the central bank does not monetize, so as to establish a reputa tion of being independent. Monetization raises fiscal deficits and ma y raise public debt relative to a nonaccommodative policy. Copyright 1987 by Oxford University Press.