DOES ELECTORAL ACCOUNTABILITY AFFECT ECONOMIC-POLICY CHOICES - EVIDENCE FROM GUBERNATORIAL TERM LIMITS
DOES ELECTORAL ACCOUNTABILITY AFFECT ECONOMIC-POLICY CHOICES - EVIDENCE FROM GUBERNATORIAL TERM LIMITS
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DOI：
10.2307/2946699
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发表时间：
1995-08-01
影响因子：
13.7
通讯作者：
CASE, A
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
BESLEY, T;CASE, A
本文通过对1950年至1986年美国州长行为的分析，探讨了一种政治行为的声誉建立模型。我们认为，面临具有约束力的任期限制的州长和那些能够再次竞选的州长的行为差异提供了贴现率变化的来源，可用于测试政治代理模型。我们发现有证据表明，如果民主党人执政，税收、支出和其他政策工具会对有约束力的任期限制做出反应。其结果是任期限制州的财政周期，当任期限制生效时，这降低了州的收入。
This paper analyzes the behavior of U. S. governors from 1950 to 1986 to investigate a reputation-building model of political behavior. We argue that differences in the behavior of governors who face a binding term limit and those who are able to run again provides a source of variation in discount rates that can be used to test a political agency model. We find evidence that taxes, spending, and other policy instruments respond to a binding term limit if a Democrat is in office. The result is a fiscal cycle in term-limit states, which lowers state income when the term limit binds.