An economic theory of alliances

An economic theory of alliances
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联盟的经济理论

DOI：
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发表时间：
1966
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
R. Zeckhauser
R. Zeckhauser
中科院分区：
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文献类型：
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作者：
M. Olson;R. Zeckhauser

文献摘要

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摘要：该报告提出了一种新的军事联盟和其他国际组织的理论模型。该模型的基本假设是，各国按照自己的最大利益行事，所有的联合企业都有“公共产品”的一面。从分析中得出的主要结论是：(1)用于联盟或其他国际组织的资源将少于最优数量；(2)联盟的负担将以不成比例的方式承担，较大的成员支付的费用高于其比例份额。本文提出了来自北约和联合国的经验数据来支持这些结论。
Abstract : The report presents a new theoretical model of military alliances and other international organizations. The assumptions basic to the model are that nations act in their own best interests and that there is a 'public goods' aspect to all joint undertakings. The main conclusions drawn from the analysis are that (1) a less than optimal amount of resources will be devoted to an alliance or other international organization; (2) the burden of an alliance will be borne in a disproportional way, the larger members paying more than their proportional share. Empirical data from NATO and the United Nations are presented in support of these conclusions.