Dangerously exposed: the life and death of the resilient subject

Dangerously exposed: the life and death of the resilient subject
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DOI:
10.1080/21693293.2013.770703
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发表时间:
2013-01-01
影响因子:
--
通讯作者:
Reid, Julian
Reid, Julian
中科院分区:
其他
文献类型:
--
作者:
Evans, Brad;Reid, Julian

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危险的生活意味着什么?这不仅仅是一个哲学问题,也不仅仅是一个道德问题,需要我们反思自己的鲁莽行为。这是理论家和政策制定者提出的一个深刻的政治问题,他们希望我们放弃实现安全的梦想,把危险作为未来生活可能的条件。正如这篇文章所展示的,这种对人类暴露于危险的必要性和积极性的信念是“弹性”新理论的基础。适应力要求我们放弃任何可以保障自身安全的信念,并接受生命是一个不断适应我们无法控制的危险的永久过程。有弹性的主体是一个必须不断努力使自己适应世界的主体,而不是一个可以设想改变世界、改变世界的结构和可能性条件的主体。然而,它是一个主体,它接受它所生活的世界的危险,作为参与这个世界的条件,它接受命令的必要性,改变自己,以适应现在被假定为地方病的威胁。这是不可接受的。这不仅在政治上是灾难性的,而且从根本上说是虚无主义的。我们认为恢复力是一种虚无主义,它迫使主体故意放弃政治,我们主张对生活的政治是什么和可以是什么进行全面的重新思考。
What does it mean to live dangerously? This is not just a philosophical question or ethical call to reflect upon our own individual recklessness. It is a deeply political question being asked by ideologues and policy makers who want us to abandon the dream of ever achieving security and embrace danger as a condition of possibility for life in the future. As this article demonstrates, this belief in the necessity and positivity of human exposure to danger is fundamental to the new doctrine of 'resilience'. Resilience demands our disavowal of any belief in the possibility to secure ourselves and accept that life is a permanent process of continual adaptation to dangers said to be outside our control. The resilient subject is a subject which must permanently struggle to accommodate itself to the world, and not a subject which can conceive of changing the world, its structure and conditions of possibility. However, it is a subject which accepts the dangerousness of the world it lives in as a condition for partaking of that world and which accepts the necessity of the injunction to change itself in correspondence with threats now presupposed as endemic. This is less than acceptable. Not only is it politically catastrophic, it is fundamentally nihilistic. Identifying resilience as a nihilism that forces the subject to wilfully abandon the political, we argue for a wholesale rethinking of the question of what a politics of life is and can be.