Production , Manufacturing and Logistics Endogenous information acquisition in supply chain management
Production , Manufacturing and Logistics Endogenous information acquisition in supply chain management
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发表时间：
2009
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通讯作者：
Qi Fu;Kaijie Zhu
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作者：
Qi Fu;Kaijie Zhu
0377-2217/$ 参见前言 2009 Elsevier B.V. A doi:10.1016/j.ejor.2009.03.019 * 通讯作者。电子邮件地址：fuqi@ust.hk (Q. Fu), kzhu@ust.hk 在本文中，我们分析了信息获取努力的内生决定及其对供应链管理的影响。更具体地说，我们考虑在单个销售季节向买家销售产品的供应商。在向供应商下订单之前，买方可以选择通过聘请专家（能够提供预测）来获取有关需求的其他信息。由于必须向每位聘请的专家支付佣金，因此在成本和信息价值之间存在权衡，买方需要确定获取多少信息。我们得出集成环境中的最佳信息获取水平，并将其与分散环境中确定的水平进行比较。我们还分析了几种类型的供应合同，以检验它们是否能够协调供应链并允许供应商和买方之间任意分配系统利润。 2009 Elsevier B.V. 保留所有权利。
0377-2217/$ see front matter 2009 Elsevier B.V. A doi:10.1016/j.ejor.2009.03.019 * Corresponding author. E-mail addresses: fuqi@ust.hk (Q. Fu), kzhu@ust.hk In this paper, we analyze an endogenous determination of efforts put into information acquisition and its impact on supply chain management. More specifically, we consider a supplier who sells a product to a buyer during a single selling season. Prior to placing an order with the supplier, the buyer has an option to acquire additional information about the demand by hiring experts (who are capable of providing forecasts). Because a commission fee must be paid to each hired expert, there exists a tradeoff between the cost and the value of the information, and the buyer needs to determine how much information to acquire. We derive the optimal information-acquisition level in an integrated setting and compare it with that determined in a decentralized setting. We also analyze several types of supply contracts to examine if they can coordinate the supply chain and allow an arbitrary division of system profit between the supplier and the buyer. 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.