Non-Additive Beliefs and Strategic Equilibria
Non-Additive Beliefs and Strategic Equilibria
复制标题
非相加信念和战略均衡
DOI：
--
复制
发表时间：
2000
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
D. Kelsey
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
J. Eichberger;D. Kelsey
摘要本文研究了n人博弈，其中博弈者对对手行为的信念被建模为非加性概率。本文提出的“不确定性下的均衡”概念是对Dow和Werlang（1994，J. Econom.理论64，305-324）到策略形式的n人游戏。在通常的条件下证明了这种平衡的存在。对于低程度的模糊性，不确定性下的均衡近似纳什均衡。在另一个极端，在低置信度下，出现了极大极小均衡。最后，对缺乏信心的鲁棒性可以被视为纳什均衡的细化。经济文献分类号：C72，D81。
Abstract This paper studies n -player games where players' beliefs about their opponents' behaviour are modelled as non-additive probabilities. The concept of an “equilibrium under uncertainty” which is introduced in this paper extends the equilibrium notion of Dow and Werlang (1994, J. Econom. Theory 64 , 305–324) to n -player games in strategic form. Existence of such an equilibrium is demonstrated under usual conditions. For low degrees of ambiguity, equilibria under uncertainty approximate Nash equilibria. At the other extreme, with a low degree of confidence, maximin equilibria appear. Finally, robustness against a lack of confidence may be viewed as a refinement for Nash equilibria. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, D81.