Practical and Provably Secure Onion Routing
Practical and Provably Secure Onion Routing
复制标题
实用且可证明安全的洋葱路由
DOI：
--
复制
发表时间：
2017
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
E. Upfal
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Megumi Ando;Anna Lysyanskaya;E. Upfal
在洋葱路由协议中，消息在到达目的地之前要经过几个中介，它们被包裹在加密层中(因此它们被称为“洋葱”)。这样做的目的是让人们很难确定是谁发送了这条消息。它是创建匿名渠道的一个实用且广泛使用的工具。
对于标准的对手模型-网络、被动和主动-我们提出了实用且可证明安全的洋葱路由协议。与Tor类似，在我们的协议中，每一方都独立地为他的洋葱选择路由路径。对于安全参数$lambda$，我们针对活跃对手的不同私有解决方案需要$O(log^2lambda)$轮，并要求每个参与者在每轮中传输$O(log^{4}lambda)$洋葱。
In an onion routing protocol, messages travel through several intermediaries before arriving at their destinations, they are wrapped in layers of encryption (hence they are called "onions"). The goal is to make it hard to establish who sent the message. It is a practical and widespread tool for creating anonymous channels.
For the standard adversary models --- network, passive, and active --- we present practical and provably secure onion routing protocols. Akin to Tor, in our protocols each party independently chooses the routing paths for his onions. For security parameter $lambda$, our differentially private solution for the active adversary takes $O(log^2lambda)$ rounds and requires every participant to transmit $O(log^{4} lambda)$ onions in every round.