Asymmetric Innovation Agreements Under Environmental Regulation
Asymmetric Innovation Agreements Under Environmental Regulation
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DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.3948436
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发表时间：
2017-12
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Naoto Aoyama;Emilson Delfino Silva
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Naoto Aoyama;Emilson Delfino Silva
在国内市场上，双头垄断生产的是同质的最终产品，即污染、减少污染和研发。其中一家公司（外国的）有上级技术.政府通过征收污染税来调节双头垄断，以最大化国内福利。我们考虑了三种创新协议的潜在实施：合作研究合资企业（RJV），非合作RJV和许可。在合作（非合作）RJV中，企业（不）内部化R&D溢出。我们表明，对于国内企业，合作RJV占主导地位，许可是最不可取的选择。虽然许可证制度对外国公司来说占主导地位，但却无法实施。两个RJV都是可实现的。虽然非合作的RJV更有可能的企业之间的不对称程度（在效率和R&D溢出率方面），合作的RJV更有可能的不对称程度较低。这两种类型的RJVs的实施提高了国内公司的竞争力和福利。当外国企业严格偏好可行的非合作型合资企业时，诱导其接受可行的合作型合资企业的补贴政策总是福利改善的。
In a domestic market, a duopoly produces a homogeneous final good, pollution, pollution abatement and R&D. One of the firms (foreign) has superior technology. The government regulates the duopoly by levying a pollution tax to maximize domestic welfare. We consider the potential implementation of three innovation agreements: cooperative research joint venture (RJV), non-cooperative RJV and licensing. In the cooperative (non-cooperative) RJV, the firms (do not) internalize R&D spillovers. We show that, for the domestic firm, the cooperative RJV dominates and licensing is the least desirable alternative. Although licensing is dominant for the foreign firm, it is not implementable. Both RJVs are implementable. While the non-cooperative RJV is more likely the greater the degrees of asymmetry (in terms of efficiency and R&D spillover rates) between the firms, the cooperative RJV is more likely the lower the degrees of asymmetry. Implementation of both types of RJVs improve the competitiveness of the domestic firm and welfare. A subsidy policy that induces the foreign firm to accept a feasible cooperative RJV when it strictly prefers a feasible non-cooperative RJV is always welfare improving.