Performance evaluation and improvement for ZEV credit regulation in a competitive environment
Performance evaluation and improvement for ZEV credit regulation in a competitive environment
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DOI：
10.1016/j.omega.2020.102294
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发表时间：
2020-06
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Weixiang Huang;Han Zhu
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Weixiang Huang;Han Zhu
零排放汽车（ZEV）信用法规及其变体现在在汽车行业中广泛实施，以促进电动汽车（EV）生产，最终目标是减少机动车的排放。在这项工作中，我们研究如何ZEV信贷监管影响汽车制造商之间的竞争和利益相关者的收益在纳什博弈。我们发现ZEV法规确实可以减少总排放量。然而，当ZEV法规变得更加严格时，它未能进一步促进甚至阻碍EV生产-EV的生产数量总是在减少，EV的市场份额也会减少。因此，如果ZEV法规变得更加严格，这在现实中确实发生了，那么过去生产电动汽车的制造商现在可能会停止电动汽车的生产，而不是燃油汽车的生产。然后，我们提出了一个修改的零电动汽车法规，其中上述不利影响被消除，使得更严格的法规可以鼓励制造商生产更多的电动汽车，并增加电动汽车的市场份额。我们还表明，这些结果仍然有效，当单位信用交易价格是内生的，或当有多个竞争的制造商在市场上。本文的研究结果对政策制定者改善ZEV信用监管具有现实意义。
The Zero Emission Vehicle (ZEV) credit regulation and its variants are now widely implemented in automobile industry to promote electric vehicle (EV) production with the ultimate goal of reducing emissions from motor vehicles. In this work, we study how the ZEV credit regulation affects competition between automobile manufacturers and stakeholder payoffs in a Nash game. We find that the ZEV regulation can indeed reduce the total emission. However, when the ZEV regulation becomes more stringent, it fails to further promote and even discourages EV production—the production quantity of EVs is always decreasing, and the market share of EVs can be reduced. Consequently, if the ZEV regulation becomes tightened, which is really happening in reality, a manufacturer that used to produce EVs may now stop EV production, other than fuel vehicle production. We then propose a modified ZEV regulation, in which the aforementioned adverse effect is eliminated such that a more stringent regulation can encourage manufacturers to produce more EVs and increase the market share of EVs. We also show that these results remain valid, when the unit credit trading price is endogenized or when there are multiple competing manufacturers in the market. Our findings have practical implications for policymakers to improve the ZEV credit regulation.