Evolutionary Games on Star Graphs Under Various Updating Rules
Evolutionary Games on Star Graphs Under Various Updating Rules
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DOI：
10.1007/s13235-011-0022-7
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发表时间：
2011-09-01
影响因子：
1.5
通讯作者：
Rychtar, J.
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Hadjichrysanthou, C.;Broom, M.;Rychtar, J.
传统上，进化博弈动力学是在混合良好的群体中进行研究的，其中每个个体与其他个体互动的可能性相同。最近的研究表明，如果种群具有非同质结构，进化过程的结果可能会受到显着影响。在本文中，我们分析研究了在极端异构图（星图）上相互作用的两种策略之间的进化博弈。我们找到了突变体固定概率的明确表达式，以及吸收（突变体的消除或固定）和固定（以固定发生为条件的吸收）的时间。我们考虑四个重要的更新规则来研究进化过程。对于每个更新规则，我们找到了一种策略优于另一种策略的适当条件。该过程在四种不同的场景中考虑：固定适应度情况、鹰鸽博弈、囚徒困境和协调博弈。结果表明，与同质群体相比，更新规则的选择对于非同质群体的进化可能至关重要。
Evolutionary game dynamics have been traditionally studied in well-mixed populations where each individual is equally likely to interact with every other individual. Recent studies have shown that the outcome of the evolutionary process might be significantly affected if the population has a non-homogeneous structure. In this paper we study analytically an evolutionary game between two strategies interacting on an extreme heterogeneous graph, the star graph. We find explicit expressions for the fixation probability of mutants, and the time to absorption (elimination or fixation of mutants) and fixation (absorption conditional on fixation occurring). We investigate the evolutionary process considering four important update rules. For each of the update rules, we find appropriate conditions under which one strategy is favoured over the other. The process is considered in four different scenarios: the fixed fitness case, the Hawk-Dove game, the Prisoner's dilemma and a coordination game. It is shown that in contrast with homogeneous populations, the choice of the update rule might be crucial for the evolution of a non-homogeneous population.