Growth, Unemployment, and Fiscal Policy: A Political Economy Analysis
Growth, Unemployment, and Fiscal Policy: A Political Economy Analysis
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增长、失业和财政政策：政治经济学分析
DOI：
10.1017/s1365100517001067
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发表时间：
2018
影响因子：
0.9
通讯作者：
Tetsuo Ono
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Brymer;Rhett and Hiroshi Ono;永瀬伸子;鷲見英司;Yoko Morita and Kazuyasu Sakamoto;Tetsuo Ono
本研究提出了一个以资本积累、集体工资谈判和财政政策概率投票为特征的代际模型。研究刻画了代内和跨代投票博弈的马氏完美政治均衡，并得出以下结果。首先，工会更大的议价能力降低了资本增长率，并在失业和公共债务之间产生了正相关关系。第二，老年人政治权力的增加降低了增长率，并将政府支出从失业者转向老年人。第三，禁止债务融资可以提高增长率，造福子孙后代;但它会影响到当今就业和失业人员的状况。
This study presents an overlapping-generations model featuring capital accumulation, collective wage-bargaining, and probabilistic voting over fiscal policy. The study characterizes a Markov-perfect political equilibrium of the voting game within and across generations, and it derives the following results. First, the greater bargaining power of unions lowers the capital growth rate and creates a positive correlation between unemployment and public debt. Second, an increase in the political power of elderly persons lowers the growth rate and shifts government expenditure from unemployed persons to elderly ones. Third, prohibiting debt finance increases the growth rate and benefits future generations; however, it worsens the state of present-day employed and unemployed persons.