Mandating insurance offers for low-wage workers: An evaluation of labor market effects
Mandating insurance offers for low-wage workers: An evaluation of labor market effects
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DOI：
10.1215/03616878-28-5-883
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发表时间：
2003-10-01
影响因子：
4.2
通讯作者：
Wolfe, B
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Wolaver, A;McBride, T;Wolfe, B
采用兼职状态、健康保险提供和工资的同步模型，我们研究了管理雇主赞助的健康保险的税法中非歧视规则对就业和健康保险覆盖范围的影响。利用1988年和1993年《当前人口调查的雇员福利补充》以及医疗保险费和最低工资的变化，我们发现，该政策使低工资主要收入者的医疗保险覆盖面最多增加了31%，其代价是低工资工人的全职就业估计减少了0.8-5.4个百分点。
Employing a simultaneous model of part-time status, health insurance offers, and wages, we examine the impacts on employment and health insurance coverage of nondiscrimination rules in the tax code governing employer-sponsored health insurance. Using 1988 and 1993 Employee Benefits Supplements to the Current Population Surveys and variations in health insurance premiums and minimum wages, we find that health insurance coverage among low-wage primary earners is increased by at most 31 percent by the policy, at a cost of an estimated 0.8-5.4-percentage-point decrease in full-time employment for low-wage workers.