Why Does Headquarters Voluntarily Transfer Its Bargaining Power to Business Units?
Why Does Headquarters Voluntarily Transfer Its Bargaining Power to Business Units?
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DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.3383020
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发表时间：
2019-02
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影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Shin’ya Okuda;Takaya Kubota;Yoshimi Chujo
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文献类型：
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作者：
Shin’ya Okuda;Takaya Kubota;Yoshimi Chujo
本文的目的是通过形式化一个不完全契约模型，提供总部自愿将议价能力转移给业务单位的原因。我们的模型表明，总部选择的均衡议价能力与业务单元运营的重要性呈负相关。这意味着，当不完全合同由于劫持问题严重限制了重要业务单位的投资动机时，总部必须为该业务单位提供一定程度的议价能力。这个结果与业务单元（例如，派生）的独立性是一种常见的可观察到的实践这一事实是一致的。基于我们的模型，业务单元的独立性可以解释为总部逐步授权的结果。本文通过提供一个关于组织结构决策的模型，对经济学和管理会计文献都有贡献。关键词：议价能力；成本结构;业务单位的独立性
The objective of our paper is to provide the reason why the headquarters voluntarily transfer its bargaining power to the business unit by stylizing an incomplete contract model. Our model shows that the equilibrium bargaining power selected by the headquarters is negatively correlated with the importance attached to the business unit’s operations. It means when incomplete contracts severely restrict an important business unit’s incentive to invest because of holdup problem, then the headquarters should necessarily provide the business unit with some degree of bargaining power. This result is consistent with the fact that the independence of a business unit (e.g., spin-offs) is a commonly observable practice. Building on our model, independence of the business unit can be interpreted as a consequence of a gradual delegation of authority by the headquarters. Our paper contributes to both of economics and management accounting literature through providing a model concerning to a decision of organizational structure. Keywords: bargaining power; cost structure; independence of business unit