Does hallucinating involve perceiving?
Does hallucinating involve perceiving?
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幻觉涉及知觉吗？
DOI：
10.1007/s11098-017-0884-7
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发表时间：
2018
影响因子：
1.3
通讯作者：
R. Ali
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
R. Ali
知觉状态理论的一个自然起点是普通知觉，在普通知觉中，一个主体成功地与她的心灵独立的环境联系起来。相应地，最简单的感知状态理论在感知上对所有这些状态建模。通常，这种简单的，关于知觉状态的共同因素关系的观点，由于幻觉是非知觉的，而被敷衍地抛弃了。但我认为，幻觉的非知觉观点被接受得太快了。我考虑了三个被认为支持这一观点的观察结果，并认为另一种观点——幻觉论——同样很好地解释了这三个观点，幻觉论认为幻觉确实涉及感知。既然如此，采用所有感知状态的共同因素关系观点仍然是一个站得住脚的选择。
A natural starting point for theories of perceptual states is ordinary perception, in which a subject is successfully related to her mind-independent surroundings. Correspondingly, the simplest theory of perceptual states models all such states on perception. Typically, this simple, common-factor relational view of perceptual states has received a perfunctory dismissal on the grounds that hallucinations are nonperceptual. But I argue that the nonperceptual view of hallucinations has been accepted too quickly. I consider three observations thought to support the view, and argue that all three are dealt with equally well by an alternative view, illusionism, on which hallucinations do involve perception. Since this is so, adopting a common-factor relational view of all perceptual states remains a tenable option.
分离思维和二元世界
DOI：
--
发表时间：
2006
期刊：
Shiso (Iwanami) No.982
影响因子：
--
作者：
小山静子;菅井凰展;山口和宏編;佐藤和夫;小杉泰;Tatsuya Kashiwabata
通讯作者：
Tatsuya Kashiwabata