Three-Party Energy Management With Distributed Energy Resources in Smart Grid
Three-Party Energy Management With Distributed Energy Resources in Smart Grid
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DOI：
10.1109/tie.2014.2341556
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发表时间：
2014-06
影响因子：
7.7
通讯作者：
W. Tushar;Bo Chai;C. Yuen;David B. Smith;Kristin L. Wood;Zaiyue Yang;H. Poor
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
W. Tushar;Bo Chai;C. Yuen;David B. Smith;Kristin L. Wood;Zaiyue Yang;H. Poor
本文在一个由大量住宅单元(RU)和一个共享设施控制器(SFC)组成的智能社区的能源管理方案中考虑了分布式能源的好处。提出了RU和SFC之间的非合作Stackelberg博弈，以探讨两个实体如何从彼此之间和电网之间的能源交易中分别从实现的效用和最小化总成本方面受益。从博弈的性质可以看出，在降低总成本方面，证监会获得的最大收益是在唯一且无策略的Stackelberg均衡(SE)下获得的。结果还表明，证监会和注册资源单位通过以分布式方式执行所建议的算法，保证能够到达SE，其中参与的注册资源单位遵循其响应证监会选择的行动的最佳策略。此外，还为证监会的存储设备引入了充放电方案，如果实施拟议的游戏，可以进一步降低证监会的总成本。数值实验证实了该方案的有效性。
In this paper, the benefits of distributed energy resources are considered in an energy management scheme for a smart community consisting of a large number of residential units (RUs) and a shared facility controller (SFC). A noncooperative Stackelberg game between the RUs and the SFC is proposed in order to explore how both entities can benefit, in terms of achieved utility and minimizing total cost respectively, from their energy trading with each other and the grid. From the properties of the game, it is shown that the maximum benefit to the SFC, in terms of reduction in total cost, is obtained at the unique and strategy-proof Stackelberg equilibrium (SE). It is further shown that the SE is guaranteed to be reached by the SFC and RUs by executing the proposed algorithm in a distributed fashion, where participating RUs comply with their best strategies in response to the action chosen by the SFC. In addition, a charging-discharging scheme is introduced for the SFC's storage device that can further lower the SFC's total cost if the proposed game is implemented. Numerical experiments confirm the effectiveness of the proposed scheme.