Referring to the social performance promotes cooperation in spatial prisoner's dilemma games
Referring to the social performance promotes cooperation in spatial prisoner's dilemma games
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DOI：
10.1103/physreve.86.031141
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发表时间：
2012-09-26
影响因子：
2.4
通讯作者：
Ikegaya, Naoki
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Shigaki, Keizo;Tanimoto, Jun;Ikegaya, Naoki
我们通过考虑代理复制邻居策略时的社会平均收益，提出了一种新的成对费米更新规则。在更新规则中，焦点代理将她的收益与她的配对对手所采用的相同策略的社会平均收益进行比较。这个概念可能是合理的，因为人们在模仿社会行为时参考的是全球信息和统计信息，而不是本地信息。我们假设社会平均数有几种可能的方式。模拟结果证明，一些有限主体的社会平均比整个群体的社会平均实现了更显着的合作。
We propose a new pairwise Fermi updating rule by considering a social average payoff when an agent copies a neighbor's strategy. In the update rule, a focal agent compares her payoff with the social average payoff of the same strategy that her pairwise opponent has. This concept might be justified by the fact that people reference global and, somehow, statistical information, not local information when imitating social behaviors. We presume several possible ways for the social average. Simulation results prove that the social average of some limited agents realizes more significant cooperation than that of the entire population.