Legislative Politics in the European Union
Legislative Politics in the European Union
复制标题
欧盟的立法政治
DOI：
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发表时间：
2000
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
G. Garrett
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
George Tsebelis;G. Garrett
本文比较了部长理事会以特定多数表决的所有程序下的立法动态。我们提出五个要点。首先，自1987年以来，欧盟各国政府一直试图通过增加欧洲议会的权力来减少民主赤字，而他们却削弱了欧盟委员会的立法影响力。根据《阿姆斯特丹条约》关于共同决策程序的版本，议会与理事会是平等的立法者，而委员会的影响力可能是非正式的而不是正式的。第二，只要议会作为一个支持一体化的企业家行事，协商、合作和新的共同决定下的政策结果将比理事会中的QMV支点更倾向于一体化。第三，如果欧洲议会议员对选民的要求更加敏感，欧洲一体化的步伐可能会放缓。第四，欧盟正在演变成一个带有严重现状偏见的两院制立法机构。理事会不仅使用QMV，而且绝对多数投票要求和高水平的缺席率为议会的决定创造了事实上的绝对多数门槛。最后，如果理事会和议会之间的分歧涉及传统的左右轴心上的监管问题，那么委员会更有可能成为理事会的盟友，而不是议会。
This paper compares legislative dynamics under all procedures in which the Council of Ministers votes by qualified majority (QMV). We make five major points. First, the EU governments have sought to reduce the democratic deficit by increasing the powers of the European Parliament since 1987, whereas they have lessened the legislative influence of the Commission. Under the Amsterdam treaty's version of the codecision procedure, the Parliament is a coequal legislator with the Council, whereas the Commission's influence is likely to be more informal than formal. Second, as long as the Parliament acts as a pro-integration entrepreneur, policy outcomes under consultation, cooperation and the new codecision will be more integrationist than the QMV-pivot in the Council prefers. Third, the pace of European integration may slow down if MEPs become more responsive to the demands of their constituents. Fourth, the EU is evolving into a bicameral legislature with a heavy status quo bias. Not only does the Council use QMV but absolute majority voting requirements and high levels of absenteeism create a de facto supermajority threshold for Parliamentary decisions. Finally, if the differences between the Council and the Parliament concern regulation issues on a traditional left-right axis, the Commission is more likely to be the ally of the Council than the Parliament.