INTERNAL DEBT AND MULTINATIONAL PROFIT SHIFTING: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FROM FIRM-LEVEL PANEL DATA
INTERNAL DEBT AND MULTINATIONAL PROFIT SHIFTING: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FROM FIRM-LEVEL PANEL DATA
复制标题
内部债务和跨国利润转移：来自企业层面面板数据的经验证据
作者：
Thiess Buettner;G. Wamser
本文探讨了内债作为将利润转移到低税国家的工具的作用。它利用德国跨国公司的数据，利用了 100 多个国家 10 年来的税收差异。结果证实，在低税率国家设有子公司的跨国公司更多地使用内债，并且随着东道国税率与所有子公司中最低税率之间的差距而增加。然而，税收影响很小，这表明通过内债转移利润对于德国企业来说并不重要。进一步的测试表明，这部分是由于德国受控外国公司（CFC）规则造成的。
This paper explores the role of internal debt as a vehicle for shifting profits to low-tax countries. Using data on German multinationals, it exploits differences in taxes in more than 100 countries over 10 years. The results confirm that internal debt is used more by multinationals with affiliates in low-tax countries and increases with the spread between the host-country tax rate and the lowest tax rate among all affiliates. However, tax effects are small, suggesting that profit shifting by means of internal debt is rather unimportant for German firms. Further testing indicates that this is partly due to the German controlled foreign corporation (CFC) rule.