Monetary Policy Committees: Individual and Collective Reputations
Monetary Policy Committees: Individual and Collective Reputations
复制标题
货币政策委员会：个人和集体声誉
DOI：
10.1111/1467-937x.00260
复制
发表时间：
1999
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
A. Sibert
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
A. Sibert
本文着眼于货币政策委员会的个别成员获得通胀强硬声誉的动机。我表明，政策制定者可以或多或少的激励建立声誉时，一个集团的一部分。但是，群体决策导致更高的预期社会福利。不公布个人的选票，增加了通货膨胀的诱惑，降低了预期的社会福利。如果中央银行的文化或规则对高级决策者的影响更大，建立声誉的动机就更大，但预期的社会福利可能会更高或更低。版权所有2003年，威利-布莱克威尔。
This paper looks at the incentives of individual members of a monetary policy committee to gain a reputation for inflationary toughness. I show a policy maker can have more or less incentive to build a reputation when part of a group. But, group policy making leads to higher expected social welfare. Not publishing individuals' votes, raises the temptation to inflate and lowers expected social welfare. If the culture or rules of a central bank puts more weight on senior policy makers, the incentive to build a reputation is greater, but expected social welfare may be higher or lower. Copyright 2003, Wiley-Blackwell.