A Complexity Result for Undominated-Strategy Implementation
A Complexity Result for Undominated-Strategy Implementation
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非支配策略实施的复杂性结果
DOI：
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发表时间：
2014
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通讯作者：
Gabriel D. Carroll
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作者：
Gabriel D. Carroll
我们证明，存在社会选择的对应关系，可以实现在非支配的战略，使用有限的机制，但可以要求任意多的策略，这样做，即使只有两个代理和两种类型的每个代理。这与显性策略的实现形成鲜明对比，其中的启示原则意味着每种类型的代理只需要一种策略;我们的结果表明，没有相应的简化原则可以存在于非支配策略。JEL分类：D82，C72，D 71
We prove that there exist social choice correspondences that can be implemented in undominated strategies, using finite mechanisms, but can require arbitrarily many strategies to do so, even when there are only two agents and two types of each agent. This is in sharp contrast with dominant-strategy implementation, where the revelation principle implies that only one strategy for each type of agent is needed; our result shows that no corresponding simplifying principle can exist for undominated strategies. JEL Classifications: D82, C72, D71