Ideologues, Partisans, and Loyalists
Ideologues, Partisans, and Loyalists
复制标题
理论家、游击队和效忠者
DOI：
--
复制
发表时间：
2015
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Despina Alexiadou
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Despina Alexiadou
内阁部长在什么情况下可以影响政府的政策议程？现有文献对这个问题提供了相互矛盾的答案。在这篇文章中，我表明，一些政治家比其他人更有可能影响政策。具体来说，我考虑了三种类型的部长：忠诚者，他们忠于党的领导人，优先考虑办公室政策;党派人士，他们是党的重量级人物和有抱负的领导人;理论家，他们有固定的政策想法，不愿意在办公室津贴上妥协。我认为，理论家和党派人士对政策的影响要比效忠者大得多。使用一个新的数据集的部长背景，并检查在18个国家的社会福利政策领域，我发现我的理论预期的支持。
Under what conditions can cabinet ministers affect the government’s policy agenda? Existing literature provides conflicting answers to this question. In this article, I show that some politicians are more likely than others to influence policy. Specifically, I consider three types of ministers: loyalists, who are loyal to their party leader and prioritize office over policy; partisans, who are party heavyweights and aspiring leaders; and ideologues, who have fixed policy ideas and are unwilling to compromise over office perks. I argue that ideologues and partisans will affect policy more than loyalists do. Using a novel data set on ministerial backgrounds, and examining the area of social welfare policy in 18 countries, I find support for my theoretical expectations.