Educational Policy and Skill Heterogeneity with Credit Market Imperfections
Educational Policy and Skill Heterogeneity with Credit Market Imperfections
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教育政策和技能异质性以及信贷市场的不完善
DOI：
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发表时间：
2000
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Ping Wang
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
J. Fender;Ping Wang
呈现了一个世代重叠的模型，在这个模型中，代理人选择是否在年轻时接受教育。教育提高了生产率，但需要通过借贷来提供资金。由于违约的可能性，贷款人可能会配给信贷。我们刻画了有和没有信贷约束的稳态均衡，并表明信贷配给往往与较低的教育和较低的实际利率有关。然后，我们研究了公共政策在弥补信贷配给所产生的低效率方面的作用，并得出了关于最优公共教育支出以及分配和分配问题的结果。
An overlapping-generations model where agents choose whether to become educated when young is presented. Education enhances productivity, but needs to be financed by borrowing. Because of the possibility of default, lenders may ration credit. We characterize the steady-state equilibrium with and without credit constraints and show that credit rationing tends to be associated with lower education and a lower real interest rate. We then examine the role of public policy in remedying the inefficiency which occurs in the presence of credit rationing and derive results on optimal public education spending and on allocative and distributional issues.