Can ‘intrinsic’ be defined using only broadly logical notions?
Can ‘intrinsic’ be defined using only broadly logical notions?
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能否仅使用广义逻辑概念来定义“内在”？
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发表时间：
2009
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通讯作者：
D. Marshall
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作者：
D. Marshall
内在属性大体上是指事物凭借其本身而拥有的属性，而不是它们与外部事物的关联方式。这篇文章认为，不可能给出一个只涉及逻辑、模式和市场学概念的“内在”的定义，并且不依赖于关于属性或可能世界的任何特殊假设。一件事物可能有一种属性，这取决于它的本质，或者取决于它外部的事物，或者它与外部的事物的联系方式。例如，考虑一块紧挨着一块黄金的锡块。这块锡的性质是由锡制成的；而它的性质是，有一块金，凭借它外面的东西，它的财产是紧挨着某物的，因为它与外面的东西有关联。一件东西可以部分地或全部地以上述方式之一拥有财产。例如，一件东西可能完全因为它的本质而拥有一种属性，或者它可能仅仅部分地凭借它的本质而拥有它。这块锡完全是由锡制成的，这完全是由于它本身的特性；而它的性质是由锡制成的，而它旁边的东西只是部分地由于它的特性。这块锡完全是由锡制成的，因为它的性质决定了它的性质。相比之下，这块锡是由锡制成的，并紧挨着某个东西，这仅仅部分是因为它是如何的，因为锡的形式有助于锡具有这种属性，而不确定它是否具有属性：除了锡是如何的之外，锡必须紧挨着什么东西才能具有相关的属性。一件事物也可能以多种方式拥有一个属性。例如，一块锡的性质是由锡制成的，并且紧挨着某种东西，这部分是由于它本身的性质，部分是因为它与其他东西的关系，它具有这样的性质：要么是由锡制成的，要么是靠近这两者的东西1。本文提出了一种论点，即不能仅用广义的逻辑概念来削弱“内在”。乔希·帕森斯在《帕森斯2001》(Parsons 2001，第22-23页)中也给出了类似的观点。虽然帕森的论点比这里提出的论点更简短、更非正式，但它本质上涉及相同的基本思想。感谢马丁·戴维斯、乔什·帕森斯、彼得·罗珀和丹尼尔·斯托尔贾尔的宝贵评论。
An intrinsic property is roughly a property things have in virtue of how they are, as opposed to how they are related to things outside of them. This paper argues that it is not possible to give a denition of ‘intrinsic’ that involves only logical, modal and mereological notions, and does not depend on any special assumptions about either properties or possible worlds. A thing may have a property in virtue of how it is, or in virtue of how things are outside of it, or in virtue of how it is related to things outside of it. Consider, for example, a piece of tin that is next to a piece of gold. The piece of tin has the property Is made of tin in virtue of how it is; whereas, it has the property Is such that there is a piece of gold in virtue of how things are outside of it, and it has the property Is next to something in virtue of how it is related to things outside of it. A thing can either partly or wholly have a property in one of these ways. For example, a thing may have a property wholly in virtue of how it is, or it may have it merely partly in virtue of how it is. The piece of tin has Is made of tin wholly in virtue of how it is; whereas, it has the property Is made of tin and next to something merely partly in virtue of how it is. The piece of tin has Is made of tin wholly in virtue of how it is since how it is determines that it has the property. In contrast, the piece of tin has Is made of tin and next to something merely partly in virtue of how it is since how the tin is contributes to the tin having this property without determining that it has the property: in addition to the tin being how it is, the tin must be next to something in order to have the relevant property. A thing may also have a property in more than one of these ways. For example, the piece of tin has the property Is made of tin and next to something both partly in virtue of how it is and partly in virtue of how it is related to other things, and it has the property Is either made of tin or next to something both 1 This paper presents an argument that ‘intrinsic’ cannot be dened using only broadly logical notions. Josh Parsons has given a similar argument in (Parsons 2001, p. 22-23). Although Parson’s argument is briefer and more informal than the argument presented here, it involves essentially the same underlying idea. Thanks are due to Martin Davies, Josh Parsons, Peter Roeper and Daniel Stoljar for their valuable comments.