Single-Trace Attacks on Keccak
Single-Trace Attacks on Keccak
复制标题
对 Keccak 的单迹攻击
DOI：
10.46586/tches.v2020.i3.243-268
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发表时间：
2020
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
R. Primas
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Matthias J. Kannwischer;P. Pessl;R. Primas
自从被选为SHA-3比赛的获胜者以来，Keccak及其所有变种已经找到了大量的应用。例如，在提交给NIST后量子密码学项目的方案中，它是一个常见的构建块。在许多这样的应用中，Keccak处理短暂的秘密。在这种情况下，侧通道对手被限制在单一观察范围内，这意味着差异化攻击被固有地阻止。然而，到目前为止，这种单一的Keccak痕迹是否足以用于密钥恢复尚不清楚。在本文中，我们提出了第一个针对Keccak的单迹攻击，从而改变了这一点。我们的方法基于软分析侧通道攻击，因此，在被攻击算法的图形模型中结合了模板匹配和消息传递。由于直接的Keccak模型不能产生令人满意的结果，我们描述了对建模和消息传递算法的几种优化。它们的组合允许在成功率和计算运行时间方面获得高攻击性能。我们在假设通用软件(微控制器)目标的情况下评估了我们的攻击，因此使用了通用噪声汉明权泄漏模型中的仿真。因此，我们假设对手的分析能力相对较弱。尽管如此，在真实噪声水平下，该攻击可以在大量评估的场景中可靠地恢复秘密。因此，我们证明了即使在DPA不构成威胁的情况下也需要采取对策。
Since its selection as the winner of the SHA-3 competition, Keccak, with all its variants, has found a large number of applications. It is, for instance, a common building block in schemes submitted to NIST’s post-quantum cryptography project. In many of these applications, Keccak processes ephemeral secrets. In such a setting, side-channel adversaries are limited to a single observation, meaning that differential attacks are inherently prevented. If, however, such a single trace of Keccak can already be sufficient for key recovery has so far been unknown. In this paper, we change the above by presenting the first single-trace attack targeting Keccak. Our method is based on soft-analytical side-channel attacks and, thus, combines template matching with message passing in a graphical model of the attacked algorithm. As a straight-forward model of Keccak does not yield satisfactory results, we describe several optimizations for the modeling and the message-passing algorithm. Their combination allows attaining high attack performance in terms of both success rate as well as computational runtime. We evaluate our attack assuming generic software (microcontroller) targets and thus use simulations in the generic noisy Hamming-weight leakage model. Hence, we assume relatively modest profiling capabilities of the adversary. Nonetheless, the attack can reliably recover secrets in a large number of evaluated scenarios at realistic noise levels. Consequently, we demonstrate the need for countermeasures even in settings where DPA is not a threat.