Corporate governance in Japan in the 1930s and its impact on financial reporting practice

Corporate governance in Japan in the 1930s and its impact on financial reporting practice
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20 世纪 30 年代日本的公司治理及其对财务报告实践的影响

DOI:
10.1080/21552851.2021.1956980
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发表时间:
2021
影响因子:
0.6
通讯作者:
Shimizu Yasuhiro
Shimizu Yasuhiro
中科院分区:
--
文献类型:
--
作者:
Masayoshi Noguchi;Kitaura Takashi;Sumi Yuta;Shimizu Yasuhiro

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20世纪30年代日本的财务报告制度是一个重要的分析主题,因为它为学者们提供了一个不可或缺的机会,以确定在不受监管的披露环境中采用的财务报告实践的决定因素。本研究考察了一种说法,即日本重化学公司在这一时期的损益表中披露的项目数量受到该时期通过企业合并使该部门合理化的国家经济政策的重大影响。为了验证这一命题,我们使用1651个面板数据集进行有序logit分析,这些数据集由104家工业公司发布的损益表组成,这些数据集来自日本数字档案中心(J-DAC)提供的企业历史资料综合数据库。我们的证据表明,由于国家工业合理化倡议推动的企业合并运动,重化工行业的所有者-管理者可能存在向公众隐瞒业绩信息的内在动机。一种可能的解释是,企业管理者希望通过提供不那么透明的信息来保护自己的主导地位,从而放大与收购相关的不确定性。
Japan’s financial reporting system during the 1930s is an essential analytical subject as it provides an indispensable opportunity for scholars to identify the determinants of financial reporting practice adopted in an unregulated disclosure setting. This study examines the claim that the number of items disclosed in the income statement produced by Japanese heavy chemical companies during this period was materially affected by the period’s national economic policy put in place to rationalise the sector through business combinations. To test this proposition, we conduct an ordered logit analysis using 1651 panel data sets consisting of income statements issued by 104 industrial companies available from the Integrated Database of Corporate Historical Materials provided by the Japan Digital Archives Center (J-DAC). Our evidence suggests the possibility that an inherent motivation existed on the part of the owner-managers in the heavy chemical industry to withhold performance information from the public as a consequence of the business combination movement promoted by the National Industrial Rationalization initiative. One possible explanation is the desire of the corporate managers to protect their dominant position from hostile takeovers by providing less-transparent information and thus amplifying the uncertainty associated with acquisitions.