Experimental analysis of denial-of-service attacks on teleoperated robotic systems
Experimental analysis of denial-of-service attacks on teleoperated robotic systems
复制标题
远程操作机器人系统拒绝服务攻击的实验分析
DOI:
10.1145/2735960.2735980
复制
发表时间:
2015
期刊:
影响因子:
--
通讯作者:
H. Chizeck
中科院分区:
文献类型:
--
作者:
Tamara Bonaci;Junjie Yan;Jeffrey A. Herron;Tadayoshi Kohno;H. Chizeck
Applications of robotic systems have had an explosive growth in recent years. In 2008, more than eight million robots were deployed worldwide in factories, battlefields, and medical services. The number and the applications of robotic systems are expected to continue growing, and many future robots will be controlled by distant operators through wired and wireless communication networks. The open and uncontrollable nature of communication media between robots and operators renders these cyber-physical systems vulnerable to a variety of cyber-security threats, many of which cannot be prevented using traditional cryptographic methods. A question thus arises: what if teleoperated robots are attacked, compromised or taken over? In this paper, we systematically analyze cyber-security attacks against Raven II R, an advanced teleoperated robotic surgery system. We classify possible threats, and focus on denial-of-service (DoS) attacks, which cannot be prevented using available cryptographic solutions. Through a series of experiments involving human subjects, we analyze the impact of these attacks on teleoperated procedures. We use the Fitts' law as a way of quantifying the impact, and measure the increase in tasks' difficulty when under DoS attacks. We then consider possible steps to mitigate the identified DoS attacks, and evaluate the applicability of these solutions for teleoperated robotics. The broader goal of our paper is to raise awareness, and increase understanding of emerging cyber-security threats against teleoperated robotic systems.