Experimental analysis of denial-of-service attacks on teleoperated robotic systems

Experimental analysis of denial-of-service attacks on teleoperated robotic systems
复制标题

远程操作机器人系统拒绝服务攻击的实验分析

DOI:
10.1145/2735960.2735980
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发表时间:
2015
期刊:
Proceedings of the ACM/IEEE Sixth International Conference on Cyber-Physical Systems
影响因子:
--
通讯作者:
H. Chizeck
H. Chizeck
中科院分区:
--
文献类型:
--
作者:
Tamara Bonaci;Junjie Yan;Jeffrey A. Herron;Tadayoshi Kohno;H. Chizeck

文献摘要

被引文献

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近年来,机器人系统的应用呈爆炸式增长。2008年,全球有800多万台机器人被应用于工厂、战场和医疗服务领域。机器人系统的数量和应用预计将继续增长,许多未来的机器人将由远程操作人员通过有线和无线通信网络进行控制。机器人与操作人员之间通信媒介的开放性和不可控性使得这些信息物理系统容易受到各种网络安全威胁,其中许多威胁无法用传统的加密方法来防范。于是就产生了一个问题:如果远程操作的机器人受到攻击、被破坏或被接管会怎样?在本文中,我们系统地分析了针对Raven II R(一种先进的远程操作机器人手术系统)的网络安全攻击。我们对可能的威胁进行分类,并重点关注拒绝服务(DoS)攻击,这种攻击无法用现有的加密解决方案来防范。通过一系列涉及人类受试者的实验,我们分析了这些攻击对远程操作程序的影响。我们使用菲茨定律作为量化影响的一种方法,并测量在遭受拒绝服务攻击时任务难度的增加。然后我们考虑了减轻已识别的拒绝服务攻击的可能步骤,并评估了这些解决方案对远程操作机器人的适用性。我们论文更广泛的目标是提高人们的意识,并增进对远程操作机器人系统所面临的新兴网络安全威胁的理解。
Applications of robotic systems have had an explosive growth in recent years. In 2008, more than eight million robots were deployed worldwide in factories, battlefields, and medical services. The number and the applications of robotic systems are expected to continue growing, and many future robots will be controlled by distant operators through wired and wireless communication networks. The open and uncontrollable nature of communication media between robots and operators renders these cyber-physical systems vulnerable to a variety of cyber-security threats, many of which cannot be prevented using traditional cryptographic methods. A question thus arises: what if teleoperated robots are attacked, compromised or taken over? In this paper, we systematically analyze cyber-security attacks against Raven II R, an advanced teleoperated robotic surgery system. We classify possible threats, and focus on denial-of-service (DoS) attacks, which cannot be prevented using available cryptographic solutions. Through a series of experiments involving human subjects, we analyze the impact of these attacks on teleoperated procedures. We use the Fitts' law as a way of quantifying the impact, and measure the increase in tasks' difficulty when under DoS attacks. We then consider possible steps to mitigate the identified DoS attacks, and evaluate the applicability of these solutions for teleoperated robotics. The broader goal of our paper is to raise awareness, and increase understanding of emerging cyber-security threats against teleoperated robotic systems.