Desire's Own Reasons
Desire's Own Reasons
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欲望本身的原因
DOI：
10.1017/apa.2021.20
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发表时间：
2022
影响因子：
1
通讯作者：
TOOMING UKU
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Riccardo Iacobucci;Raffale Bruno;Jan-Dirk Schmoecker;Tooming Uku;TOOMING UKU
在这篇文章中，我问是否有理由支持欲望的态度本质。我把这些考虑称为欲望自身的原因。我认为，欲望自身的理由是解释欲望为何满足其正确性的构成标准的考虑，当欲望的满足也会使拥有欲望的主体感到满意时，欲望便满足了这一标准。与主观满足有关的理由适合通过经验和想象来调节欲望，因为欲望对它们天生敏感。我还分析了这类理由的适用范围，以及欲望自身的理由如何与其他种类的理由联系起来。
In this essay I ask if there are reasons that count in favor of having a desire in virtue of its attitudinal nature. I call those considerations desire's own reasons. I argue that desire's own reasons are considerations that explain why a desire meets its constitutive standard of correctness and that it meets this standard when its satisfaction would also be satisfactory to the subject who has it. Reasons that bear on subjective satisfaction are fit to regulate desires through experience and imagination because desires are naturally sensitive to them. I also analyze the limits of application that such reasons have and how desire's own reasons relate to other kinds of reasons.