Acting for the Right Reasons
Acting for the Right Reasons
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出于正确的理由行事
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发表时间：
2010
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通讯作者：
Julia Markovits
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作者：
Julia Markovits
本文考察了这样一种思想，即我们的正确行为只有在我们出于正确的理由而采取时才具有道德价值，从表面上看，关于道德价值的条件的观点似乎独立于我们所持有的第一阶道德观点。也就是说，我们可以讨论正确的行为还必须具备哪些条件才能被认为是道德上有价值的，而不必首先解决正确的行为需要具备哪些条件的问题。我最初的目标是确定正确的行为具有道德价值的条件，我相信，我对道德价值的解释的直觉吸引力和我为支持它而提出的大多数论点的力量，与我们采用任何特定的观点无关。第一层次的伦理观。尽管如此，当我所捍卫的道德价值观与包括功利主义在内的任何一类一阶伦理观结合在一起时，结果却产生了令人难以置信的影响。我认为，因为功利主义者很难提出一个像我所捍卫的那样独立可信的道德价值解释，所以我对这个解释的论证结果是对功利主义的反驳。思考道德价值也许能告诉我们哪些行为是正确的。在第一节中，我介绍并开始反驳传统的康德道德价值观，即道德价值
This essay examines the thought that our right actions have moral worth only if weperform them for the right reasons.On the faceof it, views about the conditions of moral worth seem independent of what first-order moral views we hold. That is, we can debate what else must be true of right actions for them to count as morally worthy without first settling the questionofwhat it takes for themtoberight.My initial aimwill be to identify the conditions under which right actions have moral worth, and I believe the intuitive appeal of my account of moral worth and the force of most of the arguments I marshal in its support are independent of our adopting any particular first-order ethical standpoint. Nonetheless, the view of moral worth I defend turns out to have implausible implications when held in conjunction with any of a class of first-order ethical views that includes utilitarianism. Because utilitarians would, I think, be hardpressed to come up with an account of moral worth that is as independently plausible as the one I defend, my argument for this account turns out to provide an objection to utilitarianism. Thinking aboutmoral worth may tell us something about which actions are right after all. In section 1, I introduce and begin to argue against the traditional Kantian account of moral worth, according to which morally worthy