Optimal Sustainable Monetary Policy
Optimal Sustainable Monetary Policy
复制标题
最优可持续货币政策
DOI：
10.1016/j.jmoneco.2008.08.003
复制
发表时间：
2008
影响因子：
4.1
通讯作者：
Takushi Kurozumi
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Takushi Kurozumi
在最近的货币政策文献中，从永恒的角度研究了最优承诺政策及其变体，重点是政策承诺带来的福利收益。然而，这些政策涉及一个时间一致性问题，称为前瞻性模型中的稳定偏差。我们分析 Chari 和 Kehoe 的[1990。可持续计划。政治经济学期刊 98, 783–802] 可持续均衡并研究最优可持续政策，即政策制定者在最佳可持续均衡下的策略。本文表明，这样的政策在足够晚的时期内变得与最优承诺政策一致。它还表明，最优可持续政策能否达到拉姆齐均衡结果取决于模型经济受到冲击的程度。此外，本文发现一种可持续的政策能够比自由裁量政策获得更高的社会福利。
In recent monetary policy literature, optimal commitment policy and its variant from a timeless perspective have been studied with emphasis on welfare gains from policy commitment. These policies, however, involve a time-consistency problem called a stabilization bias in forward-looking models. We analyze Chari and Kehoe's [1990. Sustainable plans. Journal of Political Economy 98, 783–802] sustainable equilibrium and examine optimal sustainable policy, i.e. a policymaker's strategy in the best sustainable equilibrium. This paper shows that such a policy becomes consistent with the optimal commitment policy in sufficiently later periods. It also shows that whether the optimal sustainable policy can attain the Ramsey equilibrium outcome depends on the magnitude of shocks hitting the model economy. Moreover, the paper finds a sustainable policy that attains higher social welfare than discretionary policy does.
影响因子：
6.1
作者：
ABREU, D
通讯作者：
ABREU, D