Quantum Security of NMAC and Related Constructions - PRF Domain Extension Against Quantum attacks
Quantum Security of NMAC and Related Constructions - PRF Domain Extension Against Quantum attacks
复制标题
NMAC的量子安全及相关结构——对抗量子攻击的PRF域扩展
DOI：
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发表时间：
2017
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Aaram Yun
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
F. Song;Aaram Yun
我们证明了 NMAC、HMAC、AMAC 以及具有固定输入长度的级联结构作为量子安全伪随机函数（PRF）的安全性。也就是说，它们与针对任何可以进行量子叠加查询的多项式时间量子对手的随机预言没有什么区别。相比之下，包括 CBC-MAC 在内的许多基于块密码的 PRF 最近都被量子叠加攻击所破坏。
We prove the security of NMAC, HMAC, AMAC, and the cascade construction with fixed input-length as quantum-secure pseudo-random functions (PRFs). Namely, they are indistinguishable from a random oracle against any polynomial-time quantum adversary that can make quantum superposition queries. In contrast, many blockcipher-based PRFs including CBC-MAC were recently broken by quantum superposition attacks.