Physical Security for Fleet Management Systems
Physical Security for Fleet Management Systems
复制标题
车队管理系统的物理安全
DOI：
10.3390/cryptography4010001
复制
发表时间：
2019
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
W. Adi
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Emad Hamadaqa;Ayoub Mars;W. Adi
车队管理（FM）涉及国内和国际货物交换的运输，分销和物流管理，其中涉及全球许多运营商。车队管理涉及许多与安全相关的参与实体，例如车辆、FM移动的客户端、带有货物的智能跟踪器、驾驶员等。现有的自动化车队管理系统在由大规模生产的电子身份进行管理时，基本上容易受到物理替换攻击。模拟物理不可克隆功能（PUF）由于成本高、不稳定和效率低，无法用作不可克隆的电子身份。在本文中，我们建议部署的秘密未知密码（SUCs）技术介绍了十年前作为数字低成本的抗克隆身份嵌入在选定的参与电子舰队管理系统（FMS）的单位。SUC作为嵌入未来智能非易失性（NV）-FPGA设备中的稳定的自主创建的数字模块，预计将覆盖所有新兴的FMS物理安全要求。这样的信息保持单元（当关闭时）正在成为汽车环境中广泛使用的超低功率大规模产品。我们提出了一种新的FMS安全体系结构的基础上嵌入SUC模块在FMS中的每个安全相关的实体，如车辆，移动的客户端，智能跟踪器和货物。本文研究了在标准FMS配置中使用SUC技术作为物理安全锚时的预期技术影响。适用于FM环境的几个与SUC相关的通用安全协议展示了如何在此类FM系统中安全链接货物追踪、追踪路线和人员。它还示出了如何联合收割机其他生物特征指纹，以简化个人责任，并加强在这样的全球操作的自动化程序的安全管理。所提出的安全分析结果表明，在现有的FMS的主要安全问题可以得到解决。SUC技术的一个主要优势是，设备制造商在很大程度上可以被排除在安全参与者之外。SUC解决方案所需的FPGA技术目前还不可用，并考虑在未来使用。如果未来的电子大规模产品将部署自我重新配置的非易失性（基于闪存的）片上系统智能单元，则该概念最终适用。预计此类单元将主导未来的物联网（IoT）超低能耗应用，因为断电不会丢失任何信息。建议的SUC策略是高度灵活的，可扩展的，适用于覆盖一个大类的全球运作的保护机制类似的解决FMS的情况。
Fleet Management (FM) deals with the management of transport, distribution, and logistics of national and international goods exchange, in which many operators worldwide are involved. Fleet management involves many security-relevant participating entities, such as vehicles, FM mobile clients, smart trackers with goods, drivers, etc. Existing automated fleet management systems are basically vulnerable to physical replacement attacks when managed by mass-produced electronic identities. Analog Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) failed to serve as unclonable electronic identities due to being costly, unstable and inefficient for such mass-usage. We propose in this paper to deploy the Secret Unknown Ciphers (SUCs) techniques introduced a decade ago as digital low-cost clone-resistant identities to be embedded in selected participating electronic Fleet Management System (FMS) units. SUCs, as stable self-created digital modules to be embedded in future smart non-volatile (NV)-FPGA devices, are expected to cover all emerging FMS physical security requirements. Such information-retaining units (when switched-off) are emerging to become widely used as ultra-low-power mass-products in automotive environment. We propose a new FMS security architecture based on embedding SUC modules in each security-relevant entity in the FMS such as vehicles, mobile clients, smart trackers and goods. This paper investigates the expected technical impacts when using SUCs technology as physical security anchors in a standard FMS configuration. Several SUC-related generic security protocols adapted to the FM environment show how to securely-link tracing of goods, tracks routing, and personnel in such FM system. It is also shown how to combine other biometric fingerprints to simplify personal liability and enhance the security management in such globally-operating automated procedures. The presented security analysis of the resulting FMS shows that the major security concerns in existing FMSs can be resolved. One major advantage of SUC technique, is that device-manufacturers can be largely-excluded as security players. The FPGA technology required for the SUC solution is currently not available and is thought for future use. The concept is ultimately applicable if the future electronic mass products would deploy self-reconfiguring non-volatile (flash-based) System on Chip smart units. Such units are expected to dominate future Internet of Things (IoT) ultra-low-energy applications, as power-off does not lose any information. The proposed SUC strategy is highly flexible, scalable, and applicable to cover a large class of globally operating protection mechanisms similar to those of the addressed FMS scenarios.